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21. Introduction
Coordination failure lies at the root of underperformance by many entities ranging from
single firms to entire national economies.  As such, both overcoming existing coordination
failure and avoiding a slide into coordination failure are critical issues for the survival and
success of many organizations.  For example, Knez and Simester (2002) study the successful
turnaround of Continental Airlines in the mid 1990s.  They establish that a central feature of the
problem facing Continental executives was the role of interdependencies among autonomous
groups of employees in determining the airline’s performance.  Only through coordinated
changes in behavior could the firm’s performance be improved.  On a larger scale,
underdeveloped economies can be seen as the result of coordination problems between different
parts of an economy (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Hirschman, 1958).  It may be that no one sector
of an economy can profitably industrialize alone; instead, coordinated industrialization across
many sectors is required for an underdeveloped nation to achieve greater prosperity.  The
opposite can happen as well, with the unraveling of coordination causing a descent into poor
performance both in organizations and entire economies.
In previous research, we have used controlled laboratory experiments to study whether
and how financial incentives can be used to overcome coordination failure (Brandts and Cooper,
2004a; henceforth B&C).  B&C explored an experimental environment, labeled the "corporate
turnaround game," which simulates a corporate environment in which coordination failure has
occurred.  Specifically, the corporate turnaround game involves repeated play of a game between
four "employees" of a "firm".  The productivity and profitability of the firm is determined by the
minimum effort level chosen by its four employees. This is meant to represent a situation with a
very strong form of complementarities.  Employees’ incentives are determined by a bonus rate
set by an exogenous manager.  This bonus rate determines the fraction of the firm's profits
transferred to the employees and hence governs the benefit to the four employees of coordinating
at a high effort level.  For any given bonus rate, the game played by the employees for any one
round of the corporate turnaround game is what Knez and Camerer (1994) have called a “weak-
link game.”1  In the experimental design of B&C, employees initially faced a low bonus rate and,
                                                
1 This class of coordination games was introduced into the experimental literature as the “minimum game” by Van
Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990).  See also Knez and Camerer (2000) and Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004).
3hence, low incentives to coordinate.  Under these circumstances the experimental firms typically
become coordinated at the least efficient of the possible outcomes.
B&C then studied how changes in the bonus rate can lead to an improvement in firms’
situation. An increase in the bonus rate generally led to greater coordination.  In other words,
financial incentives can in this case be used as an effective tool for reversing a history of
coordination failure.  Surprisingly, the size of the bonus rate increase had little impact on the
likelihood of successfully overcoming coordination failure.  Apparently a change in the bonus
rate is less important for increasing the benefits of coordination than as a pure coordination
device, cuing employees to attempt a coordinated change to higher effort levels. The results
indicate that the process of overcoming coordination failure has important dynamic elements and
can not be fully understood on the basis of comparative statics.
The preceding observations raise the issue of which factors are conducive to overcoming
coordination failure and serve as the starting point for our current work. One important feature of
the B&C environment is that each employee receives feedback about the choices of all other
employees in his firm. This can be seen as representative of some environments, but not others.
In this paper we study the effect of varying the feedback on subjects’ ability to achieve and
maintain coordination.
In terms of a purely static analysis, the feedback received by subjects is of little import,
changing nothing about predicted outcomes.  However, the observability of others’ choices could
play a critical role in whether or not subjects overcome the inertia of a history of coordination
failure.  The B&C results suggest this possibility.  By the nature of a weak-link game, outcomes
can only improve if all employees increase their effort levels.  Yet, in the B&C data a unanimous
response to a bonus rate increase is relatively rare.  Because employees receive feedback about
all choices, both leaders and laggards can observe the strong effort increases of some of their
peers even if minimum effort has not changed and are able to react to this information in later
periods.  This plays an important role in coordinating at higher effort levels as laggards tend to
eventually follow the lead of employees who respond to the bonus rate increase with large
increases in effort.  If only the ultimate outcome can be observed rather than all the choices that
led to this outcome, then laggards cannot follow the example of fellow subjects who move to
higher effort levels (since their actions can’t be observed) and therefore may not increase their
4effort levels subsequently.  Likewise, leaders cannot observe that other subjects have also moved
to higher effort levels and may therefore give up (by choosing a lower effort level) before the
laggards have time to move to higher effort levels.
Observability may also be an important factor in relation to what can be seen as the
opposite problem, maintaining coordination when a decrease in the bonus rate is implemented. A
high bonus rate may be necessary for attaining a good level of coordination but can also be
financially unsustainable for the organization.  Therefore, firms have a strong incentive to lower
the bonus payment if this doesn’t disrupt existing coordination.  B&C show that this approach
works if employees have feedback on the choices of all other employees – decreases in the bonus
rate have little or no impact on existing coordination.  However, the same may not hold if only
the minimum effort can be observed. If a decrease in the bonus leads to some employees
lowering their effort levels, both leaders and laggards will be unable to observe that some of the
other employees in their firm have kept up their effort levels. For laggards this could reinforce
their decision to reduce their effort, while for leaders it could lead to a tendency to quickly
imitate the initial effort decrease of some of their co-workers.
As the preceding suggest, the experiments below vary the feedback given employees in
the corporate turnaround game to determine the effect of feedback on coordination.   “Full
feedback” shows subjects the choices of all other employees in their firm while “limit feedback”
only gives them the minimum effort for their group.  We find three regularities in the data: (1)
The use of full feedback improves the ability of organizations to overcome a history of
coordination failure, (2) The use of full feedback has little effect on the ability of successful
organizations to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence is
strengthened by the use of full feedback.  Together, these results suggest that publicizing
unsuccessful attempts to overcome coordination failure may be a valuable tactic for managers
and/or policy makers seeking an escape from coordination failure.
2. The Corporate Turnaround Game
Our experimental firms consist of four employees who choose among different effort
levels.  A firm’s overall productivity (as well as profitability) is determined by the effort of its
employees.  To motivate these employees the firm uses a bonus system that transfers some of its
5profits back to employees.  In this stripped down environment, altering the bonus structure is the
sole tool firms have available to change employees’ incentives in the firm.
Our design hinges on three basic choices. First, the firm’s technology has a weak-link
structure, with productivity depending on the minimum effort chosen by an employee. Second,
the firm manager only observes the minimum effort selected, which determines the output.
Third, the firm manager rewards employees with bonuses based on the minimum effort observed
and is able to change the bonus rate but cannot otherwise influence employees’ choices.
As discussed above, in this paper our main focus is on how the information available to
employees affects behavior. We therefore conducted sessions under two information feedback
conditions. Under “full information,” employees are informed after each round of interaction
about the effort choice of all four employees.  In the other condition, “limited feedback,”
employees only learn the minimum level of effort exerted in their firm in the previous round.
Our aim is to compare behavior under these two information conditions.
Apart from the four subjects in the employee roles, each of our experimental firms also
has a fictitious manager.  Even though the manager’s choices are exogenous, for expositional
purposes it is useful to treat the manager as a player in the game. The game starts with a
predetermined flat wage that each employee receives regardless of the outcome and a bonus rate
(B) that determines how much additional pay each employee receives for each additional unit
increase in the minimum effort.  All four employees observe B and then simultaneously choose
effort levels, where Ei is the effort level chosen by the ith employee. We restrict an employee's
effort to be in ten hour increments: Ei 0 {0,10, 20, 30, 40}. Intuitively, employees spend forty
hours per week on the job, and effort measures the number of these hours that they actually work
hard rather than loafing.2
The payoffs are given by Equations 1 and 2. All payoffs are denominated in
"experimental pesetas."  These were converted to monetary payoffs at a rate of 1 dollar or 1 euro
equals 500 experimental pesetas:
                                                
2 In the experiments, terms with strong connotations such as “effort” and “loafing” were not used.  Employees were
told that they spend 40 hours per week on the job, and that these hours could either be allocated to Task A or Task
B.  Task A plays the role of effort and Task B plays the role of loafing.
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{ }
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 (eq. 1)
Employee i:  
{ }
( )ie i jj 1,2,3,4ð 200 5E B min EÎ
æ ö= - + ´ç ÷è ø
 (eq. 2)
The firm manager’s profit depends on the minimum effort contributed by its employees,
consistent with our assumption that the firm’s production technology has the weak-link property.
Bonuses are based on the minimum effort, as implied by the assumption that the manager cannot
observe individual efforts.  As can be seen from the equations, produced surplus depends only on
the minimum effort. The bonus simply transfers a portion of the firm’s profits to its employees;
the higher the bonus the higher is the employees’ share in the surplus.
Given that in the experiments reported below the manager is exogenous, we now focus on
the proper subgame where employees choose effort levels.  For the two values of the bonus rate
used in the experiments presented below, B = 6 and B = 10, the resulting subgame is a weak-link
game between the employees.  Coordinating on any of the five available effort levels is a Nash
equilibrium.
The left panel of Table 1 below shows payoffs for the game induced by a bonus value of
B = 6.  Suppose that employees have previously coordinated on the worst possible equilibrium
where all choose the lowest available effort level, 0.  This circumstance is the natural starting
point for all considerations of a possible turnaround. What are the possibilities of a spontaneous
joint effort increase starting from a situation of complete coordination breakdown with B = 6?
One can see, intuitively, that the incentives to increase effort beyond the minimum are quite
weak and the risks are high.  An employee who considers raising his effort to 10 knows that this
action certainly causes his payoff to shrink by 50 pesetas due to the cost of increased effort.  If
all the other subjects follow his lead, his net gain is only 10 pesetas beyond the 200 pesetas he
gets without risk by choosing 0.  For the proposed change in his effort level from 0 to 10 to have
a positive expected profit, the employee must believe the probability of all three other subjects
raising their efforts from 0 to 10 equals 5/6.  Treating the other three subjects as statistically
independent, this translates into requiring a 94% chance of increased effort for each of the other
7three subjects.3  In other words, our fictitious subject must be almost certain that the other
subjects will increase their efforts for such an increase to be worthwhile for him.  Given these
grim incentives, the most likely outcome as employees become experienced is that all employees
choose low effort levels.  As noted previously, this is consistent with earlier experimental results.
Table 1
Employee i’s Payoff Tables
B = 6 B = 10
Minimum Effort
by Other Employees
Minimum Effort
by Other Employees
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
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10 150 210 210 210 210 10 150 250 250 250 250
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Now imagine that a new manager takes over the firm.  Determined to shake the firm out
of its underperforming ways, he decides to raise the bonus rate to B = 10. The payoffs for this
new bonus level are shown in the right panel of Table 1. The incentive to increase effort is now
stronger for the employees. Once again, consider an employee who has experienced the
inefficient equilibrium and is thinking of increasing his effort from 0 to 10.  While the certain
losses remain 50 pesetas, the potential gain is now 50 pesetas.  The probability that all three
other subjects will increase their efforts required to make this change break even is now only 1/2.
Assuming the other three employees are independent, this translates into requiring a 79% chance
that each employee increases his effort.  While still high, this is better than what we saw with B
= 6.  With the less daunting odds, one can imagine subjects at least attempting to coordinate at
higher effort levels.
Analogously, consider a firm that, with a bonus level of B = 10, has managed to
coordinate at the maximum possible effort, 40.  If an employee decreases his effort to 30 he loses
50 pesetas which is also the loss if all his co-workers act just like him. If the bonus is kept at B =
                                                
3 To derive this probability, solve for p such that 200 = 150*(1-p3) + 210*p3. Given the linear payoff structure the
same trade-off arises for one-step increases of effort starting at a level higher than 0, as well as for two or more step
increases when feasible.
810, there is no clear reason to expect a sudden breakdown of coordination; after all any common
effort level is a Nash equilibrium. If the bonus in now lowered to B = 6, so that the loss from
lowering the effort to a level of 30 is only 10, it seems reasonable to conjecture that coordination
will now break down more easily than if the bonus had been maintained at its initial value even
though the set of Nash equilibria hasn’t changed.
3.  Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The preceding examples illustrate that the central questions we ask in our experimental
design are not about the comparative statics of behavior in the weak-link game.  It is quite
possible that subjects with no previous experience will generally converge to the inefficient
equilibrium in the game with B = 6 and to a more efficient equilibrium in the game with B = 10.
However, our main focus is on studying whether people’s behavior can be changed once they
have interacted frequently under fixed circumstances and, more specifically, whether this ability
to change depends on the information feedback they receive. We are interested in a dynamic
issue rather than a purely static one.
Our ex ante research hypotheses were based on the simple intuition presented in Section
1. Before seeing our results we conjectured that both the attainment of better coordination and
the preservation of good coordination are easier in an environment with full feedback
information than one with limited feedback. Specifically, if the bonus rate is increased from B =
6 to B = 10 we expected the observability of other co-workers’ attempts at increasing effort
would make coordination at higher levels more likely. With respect to the preservation of good
coordination if the bonus is decreased from B = 10 to B = 6, our intuition was weaker. However,
we leaned towards the conjecture that the effect of full feedback would be symmetric to the
effect for the case of a bonus increase. We expected that observing that some co-workers do not
decrease their effort, even if minimum effort decreases, would make it more likely that play
would return to coordination at high levels.4
                                                
4 These hypotheses are presented on a purely intuitive basis rather than relying on a formal model.  In B&C we
explored the ability of assorted game theoretic models to track changing behavior in the corporate turnaround game
with full feedback as the bonus rate changes.  Quantile response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) fares
poorly as might be expected given its static nature.  More surprisingly, variants of the EWA learning model
(Camerer and Ho, 1999) also fail to track changing behavior in spite of the model’s inherently dynamic nature.  This
failure cannot be attributed to narrow technical issues about how the model is formulated or fit to the data, but
instead reflects an inability of the model to replicate how laggards respond to increases in effort by other employees.
In the data laggards tend to follow strong increases in effort by others, but in the learning models the laggards
9In our experimental sessions subjects played thirty rounds in fixed groups (“firms”) of
four employees. Treatments varied along two dimensions. The first was whether subjects
received full feedback about all partners’ effort choices in previous rounds or only limited
feedback about the minimum effort in the group. The other dimension pertained to how the
bonus changed across rounds, reflecting our interest both in how coordination failure can be
overcome and in how good coordination can be made to last.
Each session consisted of three blocks of ten rounds each. During a session the bonus
changed in a predetermined way. 5  The bonus rate and the resulting payoff-matrices were
announced at the beginning of each of the three ten-round blocks and were fixed during that time
frame.  While playing in a round with a particular bonus subjects did not know what the bonus in
subsequent blocks would be. Other than the bonus rate, no detail of the experimental
environment was varied between rounds.  In particular, in the instructions it was explained which
type of information feedback would be available in that session and that it would be the same
throughout the experimental session.
Table 2 summarizes our 2 x 2 design. The first bonus sequences we use has low bonus
rate, B = 6, for the first ten-round block followed by an increase to a higher bonus rate, B = 10,
for the remainder of the experiment.  Assuming that the low initial bonus rate induces
coordination failure, this 6/10/10 bonus sequence allows us to study the effect of the feedback
condition on the ability of firms to re-coordinate on a better outcome.  The second reverses the
order of playing with a high and low bonus rate – subjects first play two blocks with a bonus rate
of B = 10 followed by a final block with the low bonus rate of B = 6.  If initial play with at a
relatively high bonus rate leads to coordination at an effort level above the minimum, the 10/10/6
bonus sequence lets us study the effect of the feedback condition on the ability of firms to
maintain good coordination in the face of decreased incentives.6
                                                                                                                                                            
remain laggards.  Rather than being good followers, the laggards wear down the leaders into abandoning any attempt
at improved coordination.  Given these findings, it seems unlikely that the obvious types of formal models will have
good predictive power for the experiments reported here.
5 In Brandts and Cooper (2004c) we study what bonus rates would be set by subjects in the role of manager and how
employees’ responses are affected by the use of a subject as the manager.
6 Note that the bonus rate change takes place earlier in the 6/10/10 treatment than in the 10/10/6 treatment.  This
allows us a ten round overlap in which we can compare play with a current bonus of B = 10 but a differing history of
previous bonuses (B = 6 vs. B = 10).  Results from B&C indicate that it matters little whether a bonus rate change
takes place after ten or twenty rounds.
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Table 2
Our Treatments
Information Feedback Full Limited Full Limited
Bonus Rate
Rounds 1 – 10 6 10
Bonus Rate
Rounds 11 – 20 10 10
Bonus Rate
Rounds 21-30 10 6
4. Procedures
Sessions were run both at Pompeu Fabra and at Case Western Reserve.  In both cases, a
computerized lab was used to run the sessions.  For the 6/10/10 bonus sequence with full
feedback we have data from nine independent groups of four subjects while for each of the other
three treatments we have ten groups.  Our focus here is not on the cross-country comparison.  In
our regression analysis we control for the location effect, which turns out to be rather secondary.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate populations at Pompeu Fabra and Case
Western Reserve using newspaper ads, posters, emails, and classroom announcements.  Subjects
were only allowed to participate in a single session. 7 For the most part, the experimental
procedures were quite standard.  At the beginning of each session subjects read the instructions
directly from their computer screens.  Before beginning to play, all subjects were asked to
complete a short quiz about the payoffs and the rules of the experiment.  The full text for the
instructions and quiz for the full information treatment is given in the appendix.
Rather than using abstract terminology we employ a corporate context.  For example, the
four players are explicitly referred to as "employees" and are told that they are working for a
"firm."  We avoided the use of terms with strong connotations.  For example, instead of asking
subjects to choose a level of "effort" they are asked to allocate time between "Activity A" and
"Activity B," with Activity A playing the role of effort.  We used a corporate context to make the
instructions easier to understand for participants, an important issue for some subject pools used
in the broader design. It can not be ruled out that the use of meaningful context per se has some
                                                
7 The smaller number of groups for the 6/10/10 bonus sequence with full feedback is due to exclusion of data from a
group that inadvertently included a subject who had previously participated in the experiment.  Inclusion of this
observation has no impact on our conclusions.
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impact on subjects' choices.8 However, in this paper we are mainly interested in the treatment
effects of varying the information feedback and there is no particular reason to expect any
interaction effect between context and information effects.
Subjects played the game in cohorts of four employees.  As mentioned previously, these
cohorts remained constant during the course of the experiment, a fact that was stressed in the
instructions.  For experimenters who are used to worrying about repeated game effects, this may
seem like a strange design choice.  However, the field settings that we are interested in
representing involve repeated interactions among the same agents.  Moreover, repeated game and
learning effects as well as hysteresis are presumably quite natural in these settings and are
precisely the issues we want to get at with our design.  Therefore, we think that our experiments
must incorporate repeated interactions to be a useful tool.9
In each round the four employees of a firm simultaneously chose their effort levels for the
round.  In both information feedback treatments the screen where subjects made this decision
displayed the current bonus rate and the formula for the firm’s fictitious manager's payoff.  The
amount was not actually paid out to any subject, but was displayed to maintain parallelism with
sessions where another subject played as the firm manager.  The subjects were also shown a
payoff table, similar to the ones displayed in Table 1, showing their payoff as a function of their
own effort level and the minimum effort level chosen by the other employees.   This payoff table
was automatically adjusted to reflect the current bonus rate.  At the end of each round employees
were told their effort level, their payoff for the round and their running total payoff for the
experiment.
Separate windows on the feedback screen showed them the results from earlier rounds
and informed them about others’ efforts in the preceding round. Here is where the difference
between the two information feedback conditions came in.  As mentioned above, in the full
feedback condition subjects were informed about all four employees’ effort levels while in the
limited feedback condition they were only informed about the minimum effort.
                                                
8 Cooper and Kagel (2003) find that the use of meaningful context can speed up the development of strategic play.
9 Most existing studies of the weak-link game use fixed matching as we do.  For one notable exception see Van
Huyck et al (1990) – their Treatment C compares play for fixed and random pairings in two player weak-link games.
For the final round of play, effort levels are significantly higher for the fixed pairings than for the random pairings.
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At the end of the session, each subject was paid in cash for all rounds played plus a show-
up fee.  Payoff was done on an individual and private basis.  Recall that all payoffs are in
"experimental pesetas" and that they were converted to dollars at a rate of one dollar equals five
hundred experimental pesetas.  An identical conversion rate was used between experimental
pesetas and euros.  This has the effect of yielding slightly higher marginal payoffs to
coordination for Spanish sessions.  Given that the conversion rate between dollars and euros was
very close to 1 to 1 during the time period when sessions were run, we doubt that this had any
impact on the results.  Subjects in Cleveland received a show-up fee of ten dollars while the
show-up fee was five euros in Barcelona.  The larger show-up fee in Cleveland was deemed
necessary to insure an adequate supply of subjects.  There is no reason to believe that the
differing show-up fees affected our results.  The average total payoff was $20.52 in Cleveland
and 14.23 € in Barcelona.  Once we account for the differing show-up fees, the average earnings
are almost identical across the two locations.  These earnings were sufficiently large to generate
a good supply of subjects in both locations.
5. Results
Figure 1 compares the evolution over time of average minimum effort at the firm level
for the 6/10/10 bonus sequence with full and limited feedback. In the first ten rounds behavior is
basically indistinguishable across the two conditions. Observe that when the bonus is increased
to B = 10 in round 11 the average minimum effort increases by similar amounts in both
conditions.  However, under limited feedback it flattens out in round 12, while under full
feedback it continues to increase. This is exactly the difference in patterns that is consistent with
our hypotheses about the effect of limited feedback on the behavior of leaders and laggards after
some employees attempt to push effort levels upwards; below we will see that effort data at the
individual level confirm this. Observe also that the effect of pausing play to announce the
(unchanged) bonus for the last ten rounds has an additional positive effect under full feedback
but not under limited feedback.10
Figure 2 shows the same comparison between treatments as Figure 1, but with individual
employee data on effort levels rather firm data on minimum effort levels. Here it is more
                                                
10 The downward drops under full feedback in rounds 20, 29 and 30 are the result of the behavior of very few
individuals, as will be evident from Figure 2.
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apparent that, even with limited feedback, many individuals raise their effort levels in the first
round following the bonus rate increase.  The difference between limited and full feedback is that
effort decays from round 12 onward with limited feedback. In contrast under full feedback the
increase in round 11 are then followed by further increases as the leaders maintain their high
effort levels and the laggards catch up.  A similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern can be seen
starting in round 21.  One can also see how at the individual level the drops in rounds 20, 29 and
30 are minor.
Figure 3 makes it apparent how the different feedback treatments affect the behavior of
leaders and laggards.  The left side of this figure shows data from the 6/10/10 bonus sequence
and the right side shows data from the 10/10/6 bonus sequence.  A subject is classified as a
“leader” if his effort in the preceding round was greater than the minimum effort for his firm.  If
his effort in the preceding round equaled the minimum effort for his firm, a subject is classified
as a “laggard.”  Data is included for all rounds except the first round of each block.11  The
statistic being reported is the average change in effort.
Looking at the data from the 6/10/10 bonus sequence, Figure 3 tells a clear story.
Changing the feedback has little effect on laggards – on average their effort increases slightly
regardless of treatment.  However, varying the feedback has a dramatic effect on leaders.  For
both treatments leaders tend to sharply decrease their effort, but the decrease is 75% larger on
average in the limited feedback treatment.  Because leaders quickly abandon their move to
higher effort levels, it is unlikely that they will pull laggards up to a higher effort level.  A
similar pattern, albeit weaker, is seen in the 10/10/6 data.
Intuitively, this makes perfect sense.  Overcoming coordination failure requires several
things.  First, there needs to be a coordinated move by several leaders to higher effort levels.
Second, these leaders need to be willing to bear losses for a number of rounds while they wait for
the laggards to follow.  Finally, the laggards need to move higher effort levels.  With limited
feedback, the second step breaks down.  Suppose an employee moves to a higher effort level but
the minimum effort for their firm doesn’t change.  This employee can’t tell whether the lack of
change in the minimum effort is caused by a single laggard, in which case they might be inclined
                                                
11 For round 1, there is no preceding round.  More generally, in the first round of a block subjects are reacting to the
restart and, when relevant, change in bonus rather than to whatever happened in the previous round.
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to wait the laggard out, or if all the other employees are laggards.  As a result, there are cases
where a leader would have been persistent with full feedback but retreats with limited feedback.
It is these cases that drive the general inability of firms to overcome coordination failure with
limited feedback.
Figure 4 compares average minimum effort at the firm level for the two feedback
conditions with the 10/10/6 bonus sequence. Here our focus is on what happens in round 21 and
after, when the bonus rate is lowered to B = 6.  Our hypothesis was that under limited feedback
there would be a larger increase in coordination failure than with full feedback. The data in the
figure suggest that this is not the case. There is no large difference between the treatments.  If
anything, there appears to be somewhat of a downward trend under full feedback, which is
absent under limited feedback.12
Examining the corresponding employee level data, shown in Figure 5, the forces
underlying the lack of a strong treatment effect with the 10/10/6 bonus sequence are actually
quite similar to those driving the presence a strong treatment effect with the 6/10/10 bonus
sequence.  Consider play in round 1.  There is little difference in the individual effort between
full and limited feedback.  However, in the limited feedback treatment, effort levels steadily
decay over the next ten rounds while they hold largely steady with full feedback.  This is a less
dramatic version of the pattern seen in rounds 11 – 20 with the 6/10/10 bonus sequence – with
limited feedback, the laggards pull other employees down to their low effort level.  This is
consistent with our hypothesis that limited feedback makes coordination difficult because high
effort employees cannot tell that others are also choosing high effort, consistent with the data
shown on the right hand side of Figure 3.  Due to the differing initial effects of the two types of
feedback, play across the treatments starts in very different places for the restart in round 11 and
the bonus decrease in round 21.  In both cases, there is a strong movement towards higher effort
levels in the individual level data for the limited feedback treatment.  Little movement is seen for
the full feedback treatment, presumably because most groups are already doing rather well.  As
follows round 11 for the limited feedback treatment with the 6/10/10 bonus sequence, these
attempts to move to higher effort levels quickly fail.  Thus, the treatment effect that manifests
                                                
12 The sawtooth pattern in rounds 21 – 30 of the limited feedback data is due to a single subject who oscillated
between an effort of 0 and an effort of 30, causing his group to oscillate between minimum efforts of 0 and 20.
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itself here is an initial gap between the two feedback conditions and a failure to close that gap
despite repeated attempts.  These effects are driven by the inability, with limited feedback, of
firms to overcome their laggards.
On a broader level, it is notable across both treatments that a decrease in the bonus rate
does not cause a corresponding decrease in effort levels.  Once subjects are coordinated, they
tend to stay coordinated even if the incentives to coordinate decline.  Remarkably, this desire to
coordinate is sufficiently strong that the bonus rate decrease triggers a substantial increase in
individual effort levels for round 21 of the limited feedback treatment.  The resilience of
coordination explains why the predicted treatment effect couldn’t possibly occur.  We had
hypothesized that there would be a steeper increase in effort levels for the limited feedback
treatment because of an inability to overcome effort levels decreases by some employees.  Since
no such decreases take place, it is irrelevant what effect limited feedback would have had.
Beyond the interactions between feedback and changes in the bonus rate, a general point
that emerges from our data is that the richer information available in the full feedback treatment
converts a repeated coordination game into a more dynamic environment.  Specifically, it leads
to more history-dependence. The upper panel of Figure 6 shows that, for the case of limited
feedback, behavior in the periods with B = 10 is remarkably similar across the 6/10/10 and the
10/10/6 treatments. The lower panel of Figure 6 shows the corresponding data for the case of full
feedback. In this case a bonus of B = 10 leads to higher average minimum effort in the 6/10/10
than in the 10/10/6 treatments. In other words, with full feedback when a bonus of B = 10 is part
of a new beginning it leads to better coordination than when it is just part of the status quo.13
The two panels of Figure 7 compare the periods with B = 6 across the two treatments for
limited and full feedback respectively. The data shown differ in whether B = 6 is being used
before or after 20 periods with B = 10. One can see that behavior is again more history-
dependent under full feedback as there is a much larger difference in the average minimum effort
level across the two treatments.
                                                
13 We can reach similar conclusions by comparing behavior in the ten period overlap of rounds 11 – 20.  In these
rounds, both bonus sequences have B = 10 but differ in the bonus rate for the preceding block of ten rounds.
Previous play with B = 6 leads to better coordination that previous play with B = 10.
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The differences in history dependence are driven by differences in how the two
treatments impact employees’ ability to coordinate.  In the full feedback treatment, strong efforts
to coordinate are generally rewarded.  It therefore matters whether the previous history of
employees fosters especially concerted efforts to coordinate, as with the 6/10/10 bonus treatment.
With limited feedback, attempts to coordinate tend to fail.  It therefore doesn’t matter that some
individuals make a strong effort to coordinate following a history with B = 6.
To put our observations on the data on a firmer footing, we now turn to formal statistical
analysis.  In particular, we aim to verify that our preceding conclusions about the treatment
effects are robust to controls for the location of the sessions as well as firm effects.  Tables 3 and
4 show results from ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is minimum effort
for a firm. In all cases we use two ways of controlling for firm effects: clustering and random
effects.  These alternative approaches give us upper and lower bounds on the statistical
significance of the estimated treatment effects.
The regressions in Table 3 estimate the treatment effects of the feedback.  The dependent
variables include a dummy for the location of the session, dummies for the time period, and
interactions between the time dummies and a treatment dummy.  Note the overlapping structure
of the time dummies.  This implies that we are estimating differences.  For example, the
parameter estimated for “Round ³ 11” captures the difference in behavior between rounds 11 –
15 and rounds 6 – 10.  Likewise, the interaction terms between the treatment dummy and the
time dummies are capturing differences in differences.  Thus, for the 6/10/10 treatment the
parameter estimate for “Round ³ 11 * Full Feedback” captures the treatment effect on responses
to the change in bonus rate for round 11.
Starting with the results from the 6/10/10 treatment, shown in the left panel, we can see
that full feedback does not have a significant impact on play in the first ten rounds.  However, it
does impact the response to increasing the bonus rate.  With full feedback, the immediate
response to the bonus rate increase is significantly larger.  Moreover, there is a persistent effect
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as full feedback leads to significantly larger increases for rounds 16 – 20 and rounds 21 – 25 as
well.  The large treatment effect observed in Figure 1 is statistically confirmed.14
The right hand side of Table 3 shows the same regressions for the 10/10/6 treatment.
Consistent with what we observed on Figure 3, the initial effect of full feedback is positive and
statistically significant.  After this, we generally see negative signs on the treatment effects to the
extent that significant effects are observed, reflecting uncontrolled regression to the mean. 15  It is
worth noting that the parameter estimate for “Round ³ 21 * Full Feedback” is not statistically
significant.  The response to a bonus rate cut does not differ significantly across treatments,
although this largely indicates a general lack of response.
The regressions in Table 4 focus on history dependence.  We ran separate regressions for
limited and full feedback to identify whether history dependence is significant. The dependent
variables include a dummy for the location of the session, dummies for the current bonus rate
interacted with how long the bonus rate had been in use, and interactions between the preceding
dummies and a dummy for whether a different bonus rate had been used previously.  Unlike the
regressions in Table 3, we are estimating levels rather than differences in Table 4.  For example,
the interaction terms between the dummy for the first five rounds of B = 10 and the dummy for
previous use of B = 6, “6/10/10 * B = 10 * First 5 Rounds” captures the difference between the
first five rounds of play with B = 10 in the 6/10/10 and 10/10/6 bonus sequences.  The bases of
comparison are the first five rounds with B = 6 and B = 10 respectively.
Looking at the parameter estimates, the more conservative clustering approach yields
results that are consistent with the impression given by the data in Figures 6 and 7: there are no
statistically significant history-dependence effects with limited feedback, but numerous history-
dependence effects are significant with full feedback.  With the more powerful random effects
specification, we generally find some statistical significance for the history-dependence effects in
the limited feedback data, but the parameter estimates are smaller and the statistical significance
                                                
14 It is worth noting that the Barcelona dummy has a negative sign and is statistically significant with stronger
controls for firm effects (e.g. the random effects specification).  All relevant jokes about the Barcelona dummy can
be forwarded to Professor Brandts.
15 In particular, the fairly strong negative sign on the interaction between full feedback and the dummy for period 
11 is driven by groups stuck at a minimum effort of zero moving to higher effort levels with the restart.  Almost all
of these groups are in the limited feedback treatment due to the initial treatment effect.
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lower than what we observe with full feedback.  The regressions support our conclusion that
history dependence is stronger with full feedback.
6. Final remarks
The ability to observe others’ actions is crucial in the process of overcoming coordination
failure.  By extension, it also may play an important role in the turning around of under-
performing companies and other organizations. To re-coordinate at a better outcome, one needs
both strong leaders and good followers. However, to be a strong leader it turns out to be very
important to be able to observe the actions of other leaders. Our results strongly suggest that in
the process of getting out of low efficiency traps, managers of organizations should disseminate
information even about unsuccessful attempts to improve things to the rest of the organization.
This allows leaders to know that they are not alone.
In the symmetric situation, involving a decrease in the incentives for coordination, things
are different. The impact of observability on effort levels is initially large, but does not affect the
reaction to a bonus rate cut.  It appears that subjects in successful firms are influenced by the
general insight that a ‘signal’ calling for worse coordination should not be followed and hence do
not respond to a decrease in the bonus rate.  Looking more carefully at the data, the main effect
of the treatments is that limited feedback snuffs out what otherwise would be strong movement
to higher effort levels.  The same forces that drive the negative impact of limited feedback on
attempts to overcome coordination failure are at work here as well.  This again suggests that a
policy of broad dissemination of attempts to increase effort should be followed.
Two concluding notes are in order.  First, an unexpected feature of the data was that full
feedback led to greater history dependence.  In our earlier work, B&C, we have suggested that
“shock therapy” is likely to be an effective strategy for firms attempting to overcome
coordination failure – a short term increase in incentives can yield a long term increase in effort
levels without necessitating permanently high payments to workers.  To the extent that full
feedback is not possible, this suggests that shock therapy of this sort is less likely to be effective.
Second, because we are looking at an explicitly dynamic setting, our results have
implications for other dynamic settings where the stage game is not a coordination game.  For
example, consider indefinitely repeated competition among oligopolists.  Even though the stage
game typically resembles a prisoner’s dilemma, the resulting supergame yields multiple Pareto
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ranked equilibria.  This suggests that the issues of coordination raised by our experiments
capture an important element of the strategic problem facing players.
The issue then is whether the availability of firm-specific data on actions and profits will
lead to more or less competition. Standard wisdom from game theory would suggest that greater
observability should help collusion by making it more difficult for firms to cheat on a collusive
agreement, although the experimental evidence is at this point somewhat mixed.16  Our results
lend additional weight to the standard wisdom, since greater observability should help firms
solve their coordination problem.
                                                
16 See Vega-Redondo (1997) for an alternative theoretical viewpoint.  In the experimental literature, Huck et al.
(2000) present evidence that information about rivals’ choices leads to significantly more competition when
competition is in quantities, while the effect is not significant when competition is in prices. For homogeneous good
quantity competition, Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002) observe that firms collude when they are provided
with information on individual quantities, but not with information on individual profits.  Bosch-Domènech and
Vriend (2003) look for, but fail to find support for imitative behavior.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 6/10/10 TREATMENT WITH FULL FEEDBACK
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.
From now on and till the end of the experiment any communication with other participants is not permitted. If you
have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
You will receive 500 pesetas for showing up on time for the experiment. In addition, you will make money during
the experiment. Upon completion of the experiment the amount that you make will be paid to you in cash. Payments
are confidential; no other participant will be told the amount you make.
Parts, Rounds and Groups: This experiment will have several parts. In Part 1 there will be 10 rounds. After these ten
rounds have finished, we will give you instructions for the next part of the experiment. In each round you will be in
a group with 3 other participants. The participants you are grouped with will be the same in all rounds.
Description of the Decision Task(s) in Part 1 of the Experiment: You and the other members of your group are
employees of a firm.  You can think of a round of the experiment as being a workweek.  In each week, each of the
employees in each firm spends 40 hours at the firm.  You have to choose how to allocate your time between two
activities, Activity A and Activity B.  Specifically, you will be asked to choose how much time to devote to Activity
A.  The available choices are 0 hours, 10 hours, 20 hours, 30 hours and 40 hours.  Your remaining hours will be put
towards Activity B.  For example, if you devote 30 hours to Activity A, this means that 10 hours will be put towards
Activity B.
For each round of the experiment you will receive a flat wage and a bonus that depends on the minimum number of
hours spent on Activity A by a member of your group.  For all rounds of this experiment, the flat wage equals 200
pesetas.  The bonus rate, B, may vary between rounds.  The bonus rate is selected by the firm manager.  In this
experiment, the firm manager is being played by the computer.  We will always let you know the bonus rate before
you choose how many hours to devote to Activity A.
Payoffs: The payoff that an employee receives in a round depends on the number of hours he chooses to spend on
Activity A, the number of hours chosen by the others in his firm to spend on Activity A, and the bonus rate B
selected by the firm manager.  The payoff for the ith employee of the firm, Bi, is given given by the formula below
where Hi is the number of hours spent by the i
th employee of the firm on Activity A and min(HA) is the smallest
number of hours an employee of the firm spends on Activity A.  You do not need to memorize this formula – the
computer program will give you payoff tables at any point where you need to make a decision.
( ) ( )( )Aii Hmin*BH*5200ð +-=
The firm manager’s payoff depends on the number of hours spent on Activity A by the employees of the firm and
the bonus rate B.  The firm manager’s payoffs, pF, is given by the following formula.  Again, min(HA) is the
smallest number of hours an employee of the firm spends on Activity A.  (Recall that the firm manager is actually
being played by the computer.  Nobody is actually receiving these payoffs.)  Do not worry about memorizing this
formula, as the program displays the firm's payoff function any time you make a decision and the computer
automatically calculates the firm manager's payoffs for you as a part of the feedback you receive after each round.
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Playing a Round:  For each round of the experiment, the computer will display a screen like the one shown below.
The payoffs shown in the payoff table will be ad justed for the changing values of B.  For the example below, we set
B = 8.  Notice that this is displayed above the payoff table.
Each employee will choose a number of hours to spend on Activity A using the buttons on the right hand side of the
screen.  You may change your choices as often as you like, but once you click on "Enter" your choice is final.  Note
that when you make your decision you will not know what the other employees in your firm are doing in the round.
At no point in time will we identify the other employees in your firm.  In other words, the actions you take in this
experiment will remain confidential.
[Insert Screen Dump Here]
Information that you will receive: After each round you will be informed about the number of hours you have spent
on Activity A, the lowest number chosen by all of the employees in your firm, the firm's payoff, your payoff for the
latest round, and your accumulated payoffs through the current round. You will also be shown the decisions by you
and the decisions of all the other employees of your group from the current and previous rounds.
Payment: At the end of the experiment you will be paid, in cash, the sum of the payoffs that you will have earned in
the rounds of the experiment.  As noted previously, you will be paid privately and we will not disclose any
information about your actions or your payoff to the other participants in the experiment.
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Payoff Quiz
Before we begin the experiment, please answer the following questions.  For all of these questions, assume that B =
8.  This gives employees the payoff table shown below.  We will go through the answers to a sample problem before
you do the rest of the quiz.  Please raise your hand if you are having trouble answering one of the questions.
Bonus Rate = 8
Firm Payoff = 100 + 28* min(HA)
Minimum Hours Spent on Activity A by Other Employees
0 10 20 30 40
 0 200 200 200 200 200
My 10 150 230 230 230 230
Hours on 20 100 180 260 260 260
Activity A 30 50 130 210 290 290
 40 0 80 160 240 320
Sample Question:  Suppose you choose to spend 10 hours on Activity A.  The other employees choose to spend 30,
20, and 40 hours on Activity A.
The minimum number of hours an employee of the firm spends on Activity A is ______
Your payoff is ________ pesetas.
1) Suppose you choose to spend 20 hours on Activity A.  The other employees choose to spend 30, 0, and 10
hours on Activity A.
The smallest number of hours an employee of the firm spends on Activity A is ______
Your payoff is ________ pesetas.
2) Suppose you choose to spend 0 hours on Activity A.  The other employees choose to spend 20, 30, and 10
hours on Activity A.
The smallest number of hours an employee of the firm spends on Activity A is ______
Your payoff is ________ pesetas.
3) I am grouped with the same three individuals for all thirty rounds of the experiment (True/False)?
________
4) My actions and payoffs will be confidential (True/False)? ________
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Effect of Feedback, 6/10/10 Bonus Sequence
Employee Level Data
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Effect of Treatment on Changes in Effort
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Figure 4
Effect of Feedback, 10/10/6 Bonus Sequence
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Figure 5
Effect of Feedback, 10/10/6 Bonus Sequence
Employee Level Data
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Figure 6
Effect of History Dependence on Minimum Effort, B = 10
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Figure 7
Effect of History Dependence on Minimum Effort, B = 6
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Table 3
Ordered Probit Regressions, Treatment Effect of Changing Feedback
Treatment 6/10/10 10/10/6
Controls for
Individual Effects Clustering Random Effects Clustering Random Effects
Round ³ 6 -.045(.148)
-.047
(.171)
-.115
(.230)
-.065
(.128)
Round ³ 11 .591
*
(.339)
.565***
(.157)
.397*
(.235)
.355***
(.130)
Round ³ 16 .109
(.101)
.114
(.132)
-.112
(.112)
-.111
(.125)
Round ³ 21 -.040
(.160)
.003
(.129)
-.232
(.251)
-.211*
(.127)
Round ³ 26 -.048(.038)
-.052
(.143)
-.027
(.029)
-.023
(.128)
Full Feedback -.273(.549)
-.216
(.160)
.844***
(.314)
.976***
(.131)
Round ³ 6 *
Full Feedback
-.302
(.401)
-.269
(.246)
.174
(.269)
.219
(.190)
Round ³ 11 *
Full Feedback
1.012*
(.596)
.710***
(.229)
-.631**
(.307)
-.674***
(.195)
Round ³ 16 *
Full Feedback
.974***
(.315)
.690***
(.186)
.173
(.148)
.194
(.190)
Round ³ 21 *
Full Feedback
.641**
(.249)
.431**
(.195)
.006
(.288)
-.072
(.187)
Round ³ 26 *
Full Feedback
.101
(.355)
.119
(.214)
-.275**
(.110)
-.357*
(.189)
Barcelona -.425(.410)
-.709***
(.065)
-.661
(.448)
-.861***
(.063)
Log-likelihood -614.93 -431.21 -805.7 -485.19
# Observations 569 569 600 600
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Note: Parameter estimates for the random effects specifications are normalized so the standard
deviation of the error term equals one.
Table 4
Ordered Probit Regressions, History Dependence
Treatment Limited Feedback Full Feedback
 Controls for
Individual Effects Clustering Random Effects Clustering Random Effects
B = 6
Second 5 Rounds
-.068
(.153)
-.077
(.134)
-.420
(.408)
-.358*
(.203)
B = 10 .652(.483)
.749***
(.116)
1.797***
(.425)
1.787***
(.168)
B = 10
Second 5 Rounds
-.100
(.225)
-.036
(.105)
.061
(.145)
.129
(.148)
B = 10
Third 5 Rounds
.271
(.197)
.276***
(.105)
-.157
(.301)
-.129
(.153)
B = 10
Fourth 5 Rounds
.157
(.245)
.160
(.103)
-.108
(.279)
-.069
(.150)
10/10/6 * B = 6
First 5 Rounds
.589
(.554)
.723***
(.120)
1.472***
(.499)
1.482***
(.168)
10/10/6 * B = 6
Second 5 Rounds
.632
(.624)
.781***
(.124)
1.601***
(.704)
1.501***
(.200)
6/10/10 * B = 10
First 5 Rounds
-.110
(.401)
-.274**
(.109)
-.499*
(.296)
-.752***
(.153)
6/10/10 * B = 10
Second 5 Rounds
.101
(.475)
-.119
(.112)
.581
(.464)
.013
(.148)
6/10/10 * B = 10
Third 5 Rounds
-.264
(.475)
-.345***
(.119)
1.405***
(.459)
.723***
(.212)
6/10/10 * B = 10
Fourth 5 Rounds
-.198
(.506)
-.284**
(.119)
1.382**
(.561)
.707***
(.205)
Barcelona -.176(.430)
-.022
(.052)
-.965**
(.446)
-.641***
(.089)
Log-likelihood -741.40 -380.36 -646.28 -486.06
# Observations 600 600 569 569
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Note: Parameter estimates for the random effects specifications are normalized so the standard
deviation of the error term equals one.
